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7 
How Energy Policy Enabled 
the Decline of Midwestern Cities, 




Globalization can’t be seen as the sole factor that led to the decline 
in cities in the upper Midwest. Another contributing factor is 
homegrown: domestic energy policy. For instance, subsidies for 
rural electricity, funded by midwestern cities, made it possible for 
manufacturing to move to the Sunbelt. Similarly, subsidies for an 
interstate highway system established a permanent preference for 
trucking over the Great Lakes shipping ports and railroad centers. 
However, there are a number of energy policies that, if adopted, 
could foster rather than impede economic growth in declining Rust 
Belt cities. 
In 1986 Michael Kinsley wrote an essay in The New Republic that 
helped popularize the word schadenfreude in America. Schadenfreude 
is a German word meaning “glee at the misery of others,” a word 
Kinsley noted that only the Germans, with their grim humor, could 
invent. Kinsley speculated that, after more than a decade of watch-
ing vast amounts of wealth being transferred from the Northeast to the 
Texas Gulf Coast, the Northeast would enjoy watching the collapse of 
the oil and gas industry, and with it, the Texas economy. Indeed, in 
the late 1980s prices for natural gas dropped from over $4 per thou-
sand cubic feet (mcf) to below $1.50 per mcf, and prices for oil fell 
from nearly $40 per barrel (bbl) to below $15 per bbl (1980 dollars). 
As a result, the oil and gas industry began a major contraction in the 
late 1980s that continued through the 1990s. But the Texas economy, 
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while damaged, did not collapse. Nor did the Rust Belt economies of 
the Midwest and the Northeast fully recover when oil and gas prices 
remained low throughout the 1990s. 
For those of us who grew up in the Midwest, the 1970s were a 
diffi cult time. The cost of fuel at the pump had skyrocketed overnight. 
Families waited in long lines to buy gasoline. Ford station wagons 
were abandoned for Volkswagen Beetles. The expense of heating the 
family home with natural gas was even more painful, as prices rose 
from around $0.20 per mcf to over $3 per mcf in a decade. With the 
rapid increase in energy costs came rampant infl ation. Life in the Mid-
west was forever changed, with the perception that Texas cowboys had 
hijacked our way of life—and in the process pocketed billions of our 
hard-earned dollars. So it is small wonder that residents of the Midwest 
and Northeast experienced schadenfreude when increased production 
and decreased consumption inevitably led to an oversupply of oil and 
natural gas and a price collapse in the 1990s. 
To be sure, the advent of the Rust Belt economies of the Midwest 
had many causes. We have heard much about them: bloated unions, 
high taxes, globalization, and underperforming education are the most 
cited. However, there can be little doubt that the energy crisis of the 
1970s was a principal catalyst for the decline of the cities in and around 
the Great Lakes region. It decimated the American automobile indus-
try, as Japanese and European automakers stole market share with their 
smaller, more energy-effi cient models. The effects cascaded throughout 
the Midwest but were particularly hard felt in the Great Lakes region, 
where automobile and steel manufacturing formed a large part of the 
economy. 
The American Midwest was suffering from what economist Gail 
Tverberg subsequently described as the “high-priced fuel syndrome” 
(Tverberg 2012). In short, consumers are required to pay more for a 
necessity, and as a result they cut back on discretionary goods and ser-
vices. If oil and gas prices go up, so do food prices, which are dependent 
on oil for transportation and natural gas for fertilizers. Commuting costs, 
electricity prices, and business expenses increase. The result is lay-
offs, cutbacks, and more pressure on discretionary goods and services.
Property values and tax revenues decline, and the follow-on effects are 
magnifi ed. Figure 7.1 shows how acute the problem with oil prices was 
for the Midwest in the late 1970s.
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The result of the “high-priced fuel syndrome” in the late 1970s was 
an exodus out of the Midwest and the Northeast, especially of young 
people. A comparison of a timeline of infl ation-adjusted oil prices with 
demographic change in the Northeast, Midwest, and the South demon-
strates this: after decades of double-digit population growth, growth 
in the Northeast and the Midwest plummeted after the oil shock of the 
1970s. In the South, on the other hand, population growth continued 
unabated, as shown in Table 7.1.
Yet when oil and gas prices crashed in the 1990s, the Northeast and 
the Midwest failed to regain their pre-energy-crisis population growth 
levels—clearly there were other forces at work. Some of these were 
energy related and are discussed later in this chapter. Others were not, 
although arguably the initial oil shock set in motion some of the pathol-
ogies that prevented a reversal of the trend. As of 2012, however, as 
shown in Figure 7.1, oil prices were again at near historic highs (trading 
at around $100 per bbl in 2011 dollars). The midwestern and northeast-
ern economies are once more under the threat of the “high price fuel 
Figure 7.1  Historic Oil Prices, 1900–2011 (2011$)
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syndrome,” as they export more and more wealth to import expensive 
oil. 
However, the advent of shale development promises some future 
relief. In 2010 oil imports accounted for over half of the American trade 
defi cit (Economist 2010). For the Midwest, which reached “peak oil” 
(the infl ection point at which oil consumption becomes permanently 
greater than concurrent reserve addition) long before the nation did, this 
defi cit is even higher. While oil prices have not yet dropped, American 
oil imports have—principally as a result of the Bakken Shale in North 
Dakota. In Ohio, there is likewise potential for oil production from the 
Utica Shale. More importantly, domestic natural gas production has 
increased dramatically because of shale drilling, and natural gas prices 
are at historic lows. Indeed, for the fi rst time ever, natural gas prices 
are completely decoupled from oil prices, creating a migration of truck 
fl eets from gasoline-powered to natural-gas-powered engines. For the 
reasons discussed later, shale development provides considerable hope 
for an economic recovery in the American Midwest.
The volatility in oil and gas prices has hardly been the only energy 
problem facing midwestern cities since the 1970s—it has just been the 
most visible. This chapter will explore energy policies that have con-
tributed to the decline of these cities and will consider strategies that 
Table 7.1  A Comparison of Oil Prices with Population Change in the 
Northeast, Midwest, and South, 1930–2010
Price of oil per 
barrel (2011$)
% change in population
Northeast Midwest South
1930 19.00 16 14 14
1940 18.00 5 5 10
1950 17.00 10 11 13
1960 18.00 13 16 16
1970 17.00 10 10 14
1980 45.00 0 4 20
1990 38.00 3 2 14
2000 28.00 5 8 17
2010 90.00 4 4 14
NOTE: Oil prices are per barrel and based upon Brent Crude equivalencies.
SOURCE: Tverberg (2012); U.S. Census Bureau (2010). 
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might reverse some of the pathologies that have become so common-
place in the Midwest.
Some policies have had an adverse impact on cities in general; 
other policies have had a deleterious effect specifi cally on the Mid-
west. Presumably all of these were unintended consequences: the poli-
cies were intended to produce desirable outcomes, but eventually had 
results that society did not necessarily want. Those energy policies that 
have affected cities in general will be considered fi rst, and then those 
that have negatively affected cities specifi cally in the Midwest. 
POLICIES THAT HAVE TENDED TO HARM CITIES 
IN GENERAL 
Low-Cost Gasoline 
There can be little doubt that the American migration to the sub-
urbs has been enabled by cheap gasoline. There is also little question 
that federal and state policies have played a part in keeping gasoline 
inexpensive. The debate, rather, is about how much government sup-
port there really is. In other words, what is the actual cost of a gallon of 
gasoline at the pump, if you include all the externalities? Regardless of 
how one calculates this, it is clear that cheap gasoline has been a signifi -
cant incentive for the exodus from the inner cities. 
The public policy that can be most easily identifi ed that has led to 
inexpensive gasoline in the United States is the relatively low excise 
tax on gasoline at the pump. Many people would agree that excise taxes 
on gasoline are necessary to generate funds for building and maintain-
ing roads, and that those who drive the most ought to bear the highest 
burden of those costs. Many would probably also concur that we are 
currently undertaxed on gasoline at the pump; in 2010, for the fi rst time 
since President Eisenhower signed the Federal-Aid Highway Act into 
law in 1956, the U.S. Highway Trust Fund was broke. Congress had 
to infuse $8 billion in general revenue funds into the Trust to keep it 
solvent. In 2011 Congress was forced to place another $19.5 billion 
into a fund that is supposed to be self-sustaining through gasoline taxes 
(Segedy, n.d.). 
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The issue that is most often debated now is not whether we should 
raise gasoline taxes, but rather when and by how much they should be 
increased. These taxes vary from state to state, but they average around 
$0.49 per gallon (American Petroleum Institute 2013).1 In Europe, 
where migration from the central city has not devastated urban areas as 
severely as it has in the United States, gasoline taxes are as much as 10 
times greater, and prices at the pump are typically double what they are 
in America (New York Times 2011). Figure 7.2 provides a comparison 
of gasoline prices internationally. 
It is no coincidence that Europeans tend to live closer to their jobs 
than do Americans, or that Europe, as a result, tends not to suffer from 
as much residential abandonment of the inner city as does the United 
States. In short, the policy of making the cost of commuting by private 
vehicle inexpensive has also made it easier for Americans to fl ee urban 
problems rather than to solve them. 
Of course, Americans today would choose to pay just about any 
price for gasoline if it means not having to live next to urban blight. 
But the difference in living conditions that has engendered the migra-
tion to the suburbs has been created gradually. When the migration fi rst 
began, it was not a matter of escaping urban blight: it was about choos-
ing to live in a marginally better environment. We might, for instance, 
expect a working-class family to stay in an inner-ring suburb, rather 
than to move further away from employers, if faced with the incremen-
tal increase in cost. With gasoline taxes at levels similar to those in the 
United Kingdom, moving 15 miles farther from the job might mean an 
extra $4,000 per year in commuting costs, rather than an extra $2,000 
per year. For a working-class family, that would be a powerful incentive 
to stay put. 
However, low gasoline taxes are only a part of the energy policies 
associated with inexpensive gasoline. A more diffi cult consideration 
is the so-called oil and gas subsidy, the tax incentives that President 
Obama called for an end to in his 2011 State of the Union address. Any 
government subsidy for oil inevitably makes it easier for commuters to 
move away from the downtown areas toward ever-longer commutes. 
Critics of U.S. energy policy have for years called for the termination 
of what they argue are massive subsidies to the oil and gas industry 
through federal tax policies. Unfortunately, energy policy is largely set 
in the United States through advocacy, and as a result it is hard even for 
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experts, let alone the general public, to understand exactly what subsi-
dies actually exist for oil and gas. Indeed, established energy interests 
frequently express outrage over subsidies granted to “clean energy,” 
even as fossil fuel technologies enjoy over 10 times as much govern-
ment support as do these newer approaches (Plummer 2010).
The American Petroleum Institute (API), not surprisingly, argues 
that there are no such subsidies. The ability to amortize investments, 
accelerate depletion allowances, and offset “intangible drilling costs” 
from tax obligations are, according to the API, standard accounting 
practices in the mining industry (American Petroleum Institute, n.d.). 
API points out that these accounting strategies are necessary to encour-
age the sort of massive investments required for such a high-risk busi-
ness, and there is no reason to treat the oil and gas industry differently 
from other mining industries. 
Figure 7.2  Global Gasoline Price Comparison, January 2011
NOTE: “Other” refers to those costs associated with acquiring, delivering, storing and 
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In the end, we can reasonably differ about what subsidies may or 
may not exist in the Internal Revenue code, how big those subsidies 
might be, and which of them are really necessary. But it probably does 
not matter, because we do know that one massive subsidy exists for 
imported oil that dwarfs all others: the United States spends billions 
of dollars every year policing the world’s oceans, and it has done so 
for a long time. The total U.S. yearly military expenditure to patrol the 
world’s petroleum supply has been estimated to range anywhere from 
$47.6 to $113.1 billion in 2003 U.S. dollars (International Center for 
Technology Assessment 2005). 
It is this policy that makes the shipping of inexpensive oil from the 
Middle East possible. If this cost were passed along to the purchasers 
of gasoline at the pump, there is little doubt that the price of gasoline 
would be several times what it is today. Such an undertaking would also 
be a boon to domestic oil production, which would be competing with 
the actual cost of delivering foreign oil to the United States rather than 
the subsidized cost. However, we are unlikely to see this “external” cost 
realized at the pump. The notion that much of our defense budget is in 
fact a massive subsidy to Saudi Aramco is not easy to understand or 
accept. Nevertheless, the price of gasoline at the pump is artifi cially low 
as a result of this subsidy, and this reduction has enabled mass migra-
tion to the suburbs.
Inexpensive gasoline and the resultant increase in automobile com-
muting have created another troubling consequence for urban centers 
that has led to outmigration: a rise in pollution. Suspended particulate 
matter, in the form of soot, dust, smoke, and other pollutants, has been 
distributed into the air by traffi c exhaust fumes. In the United States, 
measures have been taken to reduce the air pollution generated by auto-
mobiles, including the banning of lead-based gasoline. Indeed, com-
pared to other major urban areas of the world, American inner cities 
today have good air quality, or at least not greatly worse than that of 
suburban areas. Unfortunately, many of these measures were taken after 
the exodus from the central city had already begun.
Public Policies Encouraging Rural Electrifi cation 
We often hear that the solution to our energy problems is another of 
America’s great collaborative undertakings in ingenuity and initiative, 
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usually discussed in terms of either the Manhattan or Apollo projects. It 
has been posed, for instance, that if we undertook a major Apollo-type 
effort to develop a hydrogen fi lling-station infrastructure, we could shift 
to a new transportation economy. This would be based on ultraeffi cient 
fuel cells, which rely on cleaner, locally produced natural gas as the 
feedstock, and which produce clean water as a byproduct. 
In fact, however, in the last century the United States has under-
taken two “Manhattan-type” energy policy initiatives that have had 
a signifi cant impact on midwestern cities. The fi rst was the develop-
ment of the interstate highway system, now fundamental to the fabric 
of American society. This program subsidized a nationwide preference 
for automobiles and trucks over railroads and waterways and will be 
discussed later as among those energy policies that have been particu-
larly problematic for the Great Lakes cities. The second great American 
energy policy undertaking was the program to bring electricity to rural 
areas. It is this latter policy that has, over time, done the most to encour-
age migration out of the cities (and, as will be discussed later, out of 
cities in the Midwest, specifi cally). 
In the early 1930s rural electrifi cation was stalled, leaving what 
was then a majority of Americans, literally, in the dark. The reason why 
rural markets had failed was manifest: the infrastructure to connect 
widely dispersed houses to the grid had proven too costly. The Great 
Depression further delayed investment in rural electrifi cation. The 
growing gap between living standards in rural and urban areas, a lag in 
productivity growth in the agricultural sector, and the untapped poten-
tial rural demand for manufactured items such as household appliances 
and telephones led President Roosevelt to create the Rural Electrifi ca-
tion Administration (REA) in 1935. The REA (now the Rural Utilities 
Service) has since been touted as one of the most profoundly successful 
public policy initiatives in U.S. history. Some $410 million dollars were 
set aside by Congress in 1936 for a 10-year program subsidizing loans 
to construct the rural electrical supply infrastructure. Federally funded 
public works programs such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the 
Hoover Dam were set in motion, designed not only to create jobs, but 
also to generate and deliver cheap electricity. Rural electrical coopera-
tives were granted preference in purchasing the cheapest power avail-
able, such as that generated by the Tennessee Valley Authority.
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The result was that, just two years after the creation of the REA, 
electricity was being delivered to 1.5 million farms in 45 states. By the 
mid-1950s, almost all U.S. farms had electricity service. The cultural, 
educational, and commercial disparity between rural and urban America
shrank considerably as electrifi cation spurred growth in demand for 
electrical appliances, plumbing, and information media such as radio 
and television (Malone 2001).
But as with all social engineering, an unintended consequence 
inevitably followed: subsidized power in the suburbs meant people 
could abandon the city. The initial movement outward from city centers 
began with the rapid expansion of the streetcar system, itself a product 
of rural electrifi cation. The fi rst suburbs that developed in the 1920s 
and 1930s were laid out along streetcar lines. With the electrifi cation of 
rural America, streetcar lines extended further, creating the next ring of 
suburbs, and a migration outward has continued to this day (El Nasser 
2011; Shumsky 1996).
The absorption of much of the costs of rural electrifi cation by those 
who lived in urban areas made possible the exodus to the suburbs. It 
became feasible for much of America to move “to the country”—and 
to leave behind them the developing urban pathologies. Amazingly, 
although the problem of rural electrifi cation has been resolved for some 
50 years, subsidies for rural electrifi cation continue. Today our federal 
government subsidizes rural electricity with billions of dollars of tax-
payer money through an assortment of guaranteed loans, grants, and 
preferred treatment; the most controversial of these strategies is support 
for new coal-burning plants—while the rest of the country is trying to 
cut back carbon emissions (Slivinski 2009).2 
An Artifi cially High Cost of Electricity in Urban Areas 
The energy cost increases in the 1970s and 1980s were not restricted 
to oil and gas: electricity prices also rose signifi cantly. For decades U.S. 
electricity generation, transmission, and distribution were all regulated, 
with utilities enjoying “cost plus” rate recovery for nearly all of their 
expenditures, regardless of their folly. The cost-plus strategy invited not 
only technology stagnation, but also bloated utility budgets, since there 
was no incentive to constrain costs. Inevitably, rates soared under this 
paradigm; average U.S. electricity rates rose 60 percent between 1969 
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and 1984, adjusted for infl ation (Vaitheeswaran 2004). The biggest cul-
prit for this problem lay with massive cost overruns associated with 
the building of large centralized nuclear generation plants (D’Ambrosio 
and O’Brien 2009). 
Skyrocketing electricity prices were a major blow to urban areas 
throughout America because those economies, especially in the Mid-
west, relied heavily upon a healthy manufacturing base. Manufacturing, 
which even today consumes 30 percent of the nation’s electricity (Ohio 
Manufacturers’ Association 2010), was severely damaged by this, even-
tually leading to energy-intensive manufacturers championing electric-
ity policy reform through deregulation. Ultimately this resulted in what 
one energy writer calls the “Quiet Revolution”: governments around 
the world began liberalizing their energy markets for both natural gas 
and electricity (Vaitheeswaran 2004). 
This regulatory reform, unfortunately, has not been uniformly 
enacted throughout the United States, and even when it has, it has been 
too late for many struggling urban areas that depended upon manu-
facturing jobs for their economic health. Even worse, many cities that 
reside in deregulated electricity markets are captive to transmission and 
peak capacity constraints, leading to excessive capacity (grid standby 
power) and other charges by utilities, passed through on wholesale 
power costs via regional transmission organizations. These capacity 
charges threaten the value proposition provided by deregulation. 
Energy reform legislation
The reform was motivated in part by the energy shocks of the 1970s 
and the resulting legislation: the Natural Gas Policy Act (1978) and the 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (1978). Both laws were passed to 
deal with the energy crisis that had gripped the nation and catalyzed the 
onset of the Rust Belt in the Great Lakes region. The Natural Gas Policy 
Act froze “old” gas sold on the interstate market at unsustainable prices 
but rewarded companies that drilled for new natural gas production with 
market prices, thereby eventually alleviating the natural gas crisis. The 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act, however, was less successful in 
resolving electricity problems. Its goal was to resolve electricity short-
falls by encouraging conservation and mandating that utilities purchase 
power from independent wholesale power producers. Nevertheless, the 
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existing regulatory framework caused electricity prices to continue to 
rise even as new generation was brought on line. 
Under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act the individual 
states were to encourage new generation from small (below 80 mega-
watts [MW]) facilities that used something other than fossil fuels, or 
used waste heat. Utilities were required to purchase power from these 
producers at “avoided cost,” the cost the utility would have had to pay if 
it had built new, centralized electricity generation of a like amount. But 
avoided costs were not based on market prices; there was no wholesale 
market for electricity at the time. Instead, prices were based on “but 
for” forecasts, that is, the generation cost expected to be incurred had 
no such new generation been developed, and regulators soon found that 
electricity prices had no relation to market realities. Independent power 
producers had no incentive to innovate or to provide electricity at a 
lower cost (Lesser and Giacchino 2007). 
By the 1990s a wholesale electricity market was beginning to 
develop (partly in response to the Energy Policy Act of 1992). Further, 
because of a sluggish economy, demand for electricity was stagnant, 
and surplus capacity developed. Yet power costs remained high because 
of the massive cost overruns and the cost-plus regulatory recovery 
schemes. Residential and commercial end users, with limited voice for 
advocacy at the time, could do little about this. Energy-intensive indus-
trial users, on the other hand, had the wherewithal to infl uence energy 
policy in the United States and began to lobby for the right to bypass 
utilities and to take their loads to an open wholesale generation market. 
As a result, in 1994 deregulation was introduced to America through 
sweeping regulatory reform in California (Lesser and Giacchino 2007).3 
Deregulation thereafter spread throughout the nation and continues to 
develop to this day. 
The impact of deregulation on electricity production 
and distribution
It has taken nearly 20 years for wholesale markets to develop for 
electricity, and the jury is still out on how well deregulation will work. 
Ohio, which fi rst deregulated in 2001, suffered through a deep recession 
before wholesale electricity prices fi nally began to drop. Even then, 
states like Ohio that have restructured their energy markets continue to 
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have electricity prices higher than those that did not (American Public 
Power Association 2012). 
One reason why deregulation has failed in some urban areas is that 
the regional transmission organization (RTO) remains captured by con-
strained transmission. As a result, utilities are forced to maintain large 
and expensive amounts of standby (backup) power for peak periods of 
use. This results in an RTO capacity charge passed through with the 
wholesale price that can be on the same order of magnitude as the actual 
cost of electricity. Nowhere is this problem more evident than in the 
urban areas of northern Ohio, where a 2012 capacity auction held by 
the RTO resulted in an increase in capacity charges by 2015 that will 
approach or exceed in magnitude the wholesale price of power actu-
ally delivered. In theory, these high capacity charges should encourage 
utilities to build more local capacity. In fact they do not: utilities do 
not build new generation in an unregulated environment in response 
to short-term price signals, since there is no guarantee of a return on 
their investment. If anything, high capacity charges have the oppo-
site effect—they encourage utilities to underinvest, thereby distorting 
the generation technology mix toward more expensive peaking units 
(Meunier 2010). The result is that utilities will pass through capacity 
charges—the cost of expensive standby generation—onto wholesale 
power costs that can be nearly as much as the cost of the power actually 
consumed. 
But for Ohio and other midwestern states, the damage was already 
done before deregulation. Electricity-intensive manufacturing—e.g., 
steel, aluminum, glass, and chemical industries—has traditionally made 
up a large part of the urban workforce in Ohio. These industries strug-
gled to remain competitive in the face of high electricity prices, and the 
loss of jobs severely damaged urban areas throughout the Midwest. 
Yet even while generation has been deregulated, the transmission 
and distribution side continues to be devoid of competition. Electricity, 
natural gas, and telephone grids fall into what are traditionally consid-
ered to be “natural monopolies,” instances where we cannot build and 
maintain multiple grids. The best we can do is to provide alternatives 
to the grid. Indeed, this was exactly what happened in the telephone 
industry: wireless networks provided the competition that drove down 
the cost of wired phone systems. 
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For electricity, however, utilities have no desire to see their princi-
pal asset—the grid—devalued. Not surprisingly, utilities have lobbied 
hard to protect this resource. For instance, one way of introducing com-
petition for the grid is for end users to generate their own electricity on 
site. Utilities have perceived on-site generation, the most common form 
of distributed generation (DG), as a threat to the grid and have not wel-
comed it. Utilities have been very successful in advancing regulatory 
barriers to DG that continue intact to this day. 
Generation alternatives 
Nevertheless, the next “quiet revolution” will be the introduc-
tion of competition to the regulated side of electricity. The fi rst place 
this is likely to happen will be in the shift from centralized to dis-
tributed electricity generation. It has long been thought that energy-
intensive industries like steel, glass, and chemical manufacturing could 
be “ground zero” for rethinking how energy is generated and used in the 
United States. These industries consume large amounts of fossil fuels 
and electricity to melt scrap iron, iron ore, and sand, and to produce 
chemicals. Recycling the waste heat from these industries could itself 
generate some 5 percent of America’s electricity needs. Likewise, in 
Gothenburg, Sweden, two refi neries use waste heat to provide nearly 
half the 450,000 residents of that town with district heating. None of 
the 150 refi neries in America recycles waste heat for use in residential 
heating (Vaitheeswaran 2004). 
Utilities initially disfavored DG because they found value in econo-
mies of scale: large-scale coal plants in particular were more effi cient 
and capable of producing less-expensive power than smaller plants. 
However, large-scale coal plants were not amenable to being located 
in crowded urban areas, rendering the waste heat produced from such 
plants diffi cult to use. Waste heat has a limited value unless buildings 
and homes are spaced closely together and are located near the source 
of the heat. 
Once utilities became heavily invested in the grid, they had little 
interest in local generation. What’s more, deregulation of the generation 
market cemented the utilities’ distaste for DG. Utilities today nearly
always favor investment in the grid, with its guaranteed return, to risky 
generation ventures. Indeed, the bigger the grid became, the more money
utilities made. So when large-scale power users began to push for 
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opportunities to self-generate, utilities pushed back with an assortment 
of obstacles, ranging from exit and standby fees to heavy-handed inter-
connection standards. DG was simply not cost effective except for very 
large industrial users. 
The effects on cities were twofold. First, because cogeneration (also 
called “combined heat and power,” or CHP) was not cost effective, few 
cities developed heating networks to use waste heat. And second, as 
large industrial users departed from the grid through the deregulation 
of power generation, captured urban residential and commercial users 
were left behind to pay a larger share of the cost overruns associated 
with nuclear and other expensive power. Rural residents, on the other 
hand, were able to avoid this capture through their cooperatives. 
Successful lobbying by the clean energy industry and others, 
including smaller industrial users and new aggregated power purchas-
ing cooperatives, has led to some regulatory reform. Most notably, net 
metering (where meters run backward when excess power from DG 
is placed into the grid) rules have enabled a recent increase in small-
scale renewable DG. However CHP, the most cost-effective form of 
DG, continues to be ineligible for net metering in most jurisdictions, 
and standby fees continue to render most CHP projects uneconomical. 
Moreover, the changes that have been made have been mostly too little 
too late: the longtime preference for centralized power has made it dif-
fi cult for cities now to develop waste heat networks similar to those that 
exist in Europe. A hostile regulatory environment and a lack of a heat 
transportation infrastructure have colluded to play a role in the decline 
of urban economies. 
ENERGY POLICIES THAT HAVE TENDED TO 
SPECIFICALLY HARM MIDWESTERN CITIES 
Cheap Air Conditioning
For all the angst over public policies that have led to the exodus 
from the Midwest to the South and Southwest, none would matter but 
for the advent of inexpensive air conditioning. Around the same time 
that the energy crisis gripped the Midwest, air conditioning had begun 
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to be widely available, cheap, and commonplace throughout the United 
States. Until this transformation, the climates of the American South 
and Southwest were miserable to live in year-round.
It is diffi cult to overstate how cheap air-conditioning has changed 
U.S. society. It catalyzed the population boom in the South and South-
west (Cooper 1998), and it reformed the American political landscape 
(Pfi ffner 2009).4 We have become so dependent on air conditioning that 
some have likened it to a drug. Anyone who has stepped into an air-
conditioned store on a hot summer day can attest to the sense of instant 
gratifi cation climate control can provide. Fifty years ago a third of the 
U.S. population resided in the South and Southwest; now it is over half. 
The relocation of manufacturing, businesses, and jobs to the American 
South is a direct result of air conditioning and of the energy policies that 
made it cheap (Evans 2005).
The policy that has most enabled this transformation has been the 
Rural Electrifi cation Act (REA), which provided the largely rural south 
with the favorable electricity rates that allowed it to grow (Diamond 
and Moezzi, n.d.). Without the REA, it would have taken generations 
longer for air conditioning to become affordable in the South, if ever. 
But it is hardly the only energy policy that enabled cheap air condi-
tioning: the failure to account for external environmental costs asso-
ciated with the emission of refrigerants has also served to artifi cially 
suppress the cost of air conditioning. In the 1980s, wealthier countries, 
such as the United States, moved away from using chlorofl uorocarbons 
(CFCs) for air conditioning to save the atmosphere’s ozone layer, but 
the replacement refrigerants are still highly potent greenhouse gases. 
North America, with 6 percent of the world’s people, accounts for 40 
percent of the world refrigerant market (Cox 2007). The South and the 
Southwest represent the vast majority of this usage—and our policies 
ignoring the actual cost of air conditioning have made it easier for busi-
nesses and manufacturing to move there. 
In the Midwest, summers can be uncomfortably hot for short peri-
ods, but brief spans of heat are not debilitating to labor. Long periods 
of cold, on the other hand, can be inexpensively managed with proper 
clothing and heating systems. Manufacturing has historically thrived 
in cold climates and could not have been successfully implemented in 
a climate where intense heat dominated for half the year. Cities like 
Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, and New Orleans in the past were home to 
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sleepy societies where work often shut down during the long summer. 
There was no interest by captains of industry to relocate manufactur-
ing to the U.S. South or Southwest—or to Mexico or other subtropical 
countries, for that matter—due to the toll taken on both the workforce 
and machinery. 
Cheap air conditioning changed all of that. With the emergence 
of mechanical cooling, working conditions in factories improved and 
entire manufacturing industries rose up in the South, facilitating the 
explosive economic development and population growth in the Sunbelt 
region. Air conditioning did more than make the workplace bearable; 
it also enabled the South to manufacture products sensitive to heat and 
humidity, such as textiles, color printing, pharmaceuticals, and food 
processing. In addition, the offi ce environment improved, with air con-
ditioning becoming an important factor in workplace effi ciency (Stein-
metz 2010). One study tested federal employees and found a 24 percent 
increase in output by typists when transferred from an environment 
without air conditioning to one with it (Cooper 1998).
Before air conditioning, the extreme heat in the South was not only 
uncomfortable and counterproductive, it was also a major health con-
cern, as it facilitated the spread of disease. With the introduction of 
air conditioning, infant mortality was reduced and malaria eliminated 
(Arsenault 1984). The South became a more pleasant and attractive 
place to live as air conditioning and technological advances brought 
about improvements in public health. 
Air conditioning was originally implemented in industrial and 
commercial settings but eventually proliferated in residential homes 
and automobiles, as the technology became not only cheaper, but also 
smaller and less dangerous with the development of nontoxic coolants. 
Several types of air conditioners were available on the market starting 
in the 1930s, but as they were both expensive and cumbersome, they 
remained a novelty for home use for the next 20 years. In 1951, an inex-
pensive, effi cient window air conditioning unit was fi nally introduced 
and became popular. By 1965, central air conditioning had entered the 
market and could be found in 10 percent of homes in the United States 
(Carrier, n.d.). With technology steadily improving, most new homes 
were being built with central air conditioning, and window air condi-
tioners were increasingly fi nancially accessible (Great Achievements 
2013). By 1975, air conditioning existed in 50 percent of American 
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homes. By the 1980s, when depopulation of the Rust Belt in favor of 
the Sunbelt had begun in earnest, 90 percent of new homes in the South 
had adopted central air conditioning (Pipe Doctor Plumbing, Heating, 
and Air Conditioning, n.d.). 
Paralleling this development was air conditioning in cars. Air 
conditioning in automobiles was fi rst available as a factory-installed 
accessory in 1940 with the Packard line, but with the onset of World 
War II, growth in this sector was stunted along with the rest of the air-
conditioning market. Even in the 1950s, the air-conditioned car was 
considered an extraordinary luxury and the ultimate status symbol, to 
the degree that some people in Texas drove around with their windows 
rolled up in the 100-degree heat just to give the impression that their 
car had air conditioning installed. By 1973, however, more than 80 per-
cent of new cars in the South were being outfi tted with air conditioning 
(Fergusson 2006).
Today we live in a very different world, where the hot climate 
is considered a reason to live permanently in the South rather than a 
reason to avoid it. This is more than a little bit due to the advent of 
inexpensive air conditioning. Most Americans prefer suffering through 
a short walk in intense heat from their air-conditioned house to their 
air-conditioned car to digging out of a snow drift and scraping ice off 
their car windows. Corporations are eager to blame their decisions to 
relocate manufacturing to the Sunbelt on unfavorable tax rates, unions, 
and other dollars and cents considerations. But one wonders how much 
executive distaste for midwestern winters controls decisions about relo-
cations for manufacturing. So long as air conditioning is cheap and 
readily available, no amount of tax incentives or union concessions can 
compete with a lifestyle preference for mild winters.
Promotion of Trucking over Railroads and Waterways
The U.S. government undertook a major social initiative in the 
1950s and 1960s designed to make interstate transportation by auto-
mobile easier and less expensive. This energy policy would have inter-
esting and momentous consequences for the American Midwest. The 
program was promulgated during the Eisenhower Administration as 
the American Federal-Aid Highway Act. The initiative consisted of 
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the development of a national trust for the purchase, through eminent 
domain, of large amounts of private land, and the subsequent building 
of an interstate highway system unlike anything ever seen. In short, the 
United States embarked upon a strategy to build a highway and bridge 
infrastructure that would transform the American landscape forever, 
making travel across the country easier, faster, and less expensive. 
Change the landscape it did—and a great deal more: it forever 
altered American culture. Trucking benefi ted relative to railroads and 
waterways, helping it to become the transportation mode of choice for 
shipping a wide range of goods and materials throughout America. This 
contributed to the decline of the traditional midwestern transportation 
economy—railroads and waterways—and with it, to the decline of the 
Great Lakes port communities. 
Developing a network of major interstate highways was certainly 
a laudable public policy: driving time and costs were reduced signifi -
cantly, and travel effi ciencies inured to the benefi t of all, as the expenses 
of transporting goods dropped. Moreover, the indirect subsidy to the 
automobile industry was a short-term boost to the Great Lakes cities 
that manufactured trucks, automobiles, and parts. However, the long-
term effect on these cities manifested itself later in another, less desir-
able manner: Great Lakes shipping ports and railroad terminals became 
largely obsolete. The advent of subsidized high-speed interstate high-
ways, combined with subsidized cheap gasoline and diesel fuel, inevi-
tably led trucking to become the preferred method of transportation of 
goods and materials across America. From Duluth to Buffalo, Great 
Lake cities watched their once-busy harbors turn into ghost ports. Rail-
road terminals across the Midwest also shut down, and with them disap-
peared the livelihoods of many Midwestern families who had worked 
on those trains for generations. 
Although the majority of the people in America at that time were 
located in the Midwest or the Northeast, the new superhighways criss-
crossed the country in equally spaced patterns without regard to popula-
tion. The goal of the new interstate system was, after all, to make travel 
among the states easier—and this included crossing the underpopulated 
regions of the South and Southwest. The consequence, however, was 
to indirectly support migration to the rural South and Southwest. The 
new interstate highway system not only helped render obsolete the tra-
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ditional transportation economy of the Midwest, it also subsidized the 
inevitable movement of workers to the South and Southwest by making 
it cheaper to transport goods and materials to and from those regions. 
Failure to Embrace Change in Energy Policy
A third category of energy policy that generally has had a troubling 
result for midwestern cities stems from a behavioral disorder common 
to all leaders who set public policy: the failure to identify and under-
stand social change, and to respond to that change in a timely way. The 
general reason for this shortcoming is that vested interests, especially in 
the trillion-dollar-a-year energy business, usually resist change might-
ily. Steps that may be good for society in general may not be good for a 
particular sector of the economy, and that segment may be particularly 
persuasive in helping government leaders to set public policy. In a soci-
ety where policy is made by competing advocacy groups, alignment 
with the status quo has a signifi cant advantage. 
The best example of how this culture can be shortsighted relates 
to the political resistance to the adoption of Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) standards. These guidelines were originally estab-
lished as a means of improving automobile effi ciency in response to the 
1973–1974 Arab oil embargo, which caused crude oil prices to triple 
and exposed the United States to vulnerabilities in relying on imported 
petroleum. In the period leading up to this fi rst oil shock, new-car fl eet 
fuel economy had dipped from 14.8 miles per gallon (mpg) in 1967 to 
12.9 mpg in 1974. With the Energy Policy Conservation Act of 1975, 
CAFE standards required the passenger-car program to achieve new-
car fl eet fuel economy standards of 27.5 mpg by 1985. 
Control over the passenger-car program remained in the hands of 
the Secretary of Transportation, and standards could be adjusted with-
in a range of 26 to 27.5 mpg without requiring Energy Policy Con-
servation Act amendments and the subsequent approval of Congress. 
Under the same act, the National Highway Traffi c Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA) was given authority over the structure and alterations 
of the light-truck program (Yacobucchi and Bamberger 2007). CAFE 
standards set by the NHTSA were only held to the “maximum feasible 
fuel economy standards,” broadly defi ned by Congress as having tech-
nological feasibility, economic practicability, and consideration for the 
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effect of other standards on fuel economy and the need of the nation to 
conserve energy (Moulton, n.d.).
The predictable reaction from the automobile and petroleum indus-
tries was to resist any change as long as possible. This strategy worked. 
Since achieving the fi rst target of improving fuel economy to 27.5 mpg 
in 1985, no improvement in standards has been made, and none is antic-
ipated until 2017. Further, those energy effi ciency standards that were 
adopted were easily circumvented. A sport utility vehicle (SUV) loop-
hole was exploited that encouraged American families to buy trucks 
(including SUVS) instead of cars. Light trucks with a gross vehicle 
weight rating of 8,500 pounds are exempt from CAFE standards. For 
light trucks under this weight, fuel economy standards only increased 
by 2 mpg, from 20.2 to 22.2, during the 15 years between 1992 and 
2007 (NHTSA 2013). Buoyed by the SUV market, truck sales in Amer-
ica exploded, eventually overtaking car sales by the late 1990s. 
Unfortunately, this only served to put the U.S. automobile industry 
at a competitive disadvantage to its European and Japanese counter-
parts, who continued to build more effi cient cars. As oil prices rose 
sharply in the mid-2000s, truck sales faltered (see Figure 7.3). By 2008, 
with the economy in free fall, car sales caught up with truck sales for 
the fi rst time in over a decade, as sales for trucks dropped to half of 
their 1990 numbers. American car companies, notably the Detroit Three 
(GM, Ford, and Chrysler), were in no position to weather the storm, 
as profi ts had become heavily dependent on SUV and truck sales, and 
these fi rms required government support to stay afl oat. Resistance to 
the CAFE standards, in response to a perceived threat to the viability of 
the American automobile industry, contributed to the near bankruptcy 
of this entire U.S. industry. Midwestern cities, especially Great Lakes 
cities, suffered grievously in the process. 
The resistance to deregulation of electricity markets and to DG pro-
vides other examples where vested interests have conspired to thwart 
job creation in the Midwest, especially in traditional manufacturing 
industries such as steel, glass, and chemicals. The overall dependence 
of centralized generation upon the importation of fossil fuels has inten-
sifi ed the high cost of power for midwestern urban areas, insofar as this 
region has traditionally been an importer of coal, oil, and gas. DG, on 
the other hand, tends to rely on local fuels such as waste heat, solar, and 
wind, and as a result usually returns more money to the local economy. 
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According to one expert, as much as 50 percent of every dollar spent on 
conventional centralized generation leaves the community. However, 
for renewable DG, about $1.40 is returned to the local community for 
every dollar spent (Sovacool and Watts 2009).
There will always be resistance to change by those who stand to 
lose from it. But when it comes to energy, policymakers are particularly 
vulnerable to short-sighted decisions. The stakes for energy genera-
tion choice are enormous. We can expect parties to aggressively advo-
cate their own interests in the status quo. Unfortunately for midwest-
ern cities, this intransigence has too frequently been harmful to local 
economies.
Figure 7.3  U.S. Car and Truck Sales, 1950–2010
NOTE: “Trucks” includes Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs).
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ENERGY POLICES THAT WILL HELP MIDWESTERN 
CITIES RECOVER
U.S. energy policy in the past 70 years has encouraged migration 
of jobs and residents out of the Midwest, and this needs to change. Yet 
we do not want to rebuild midwestern cities at the expense of rural 
areas, or at the expense of the South or Southwest. Certainly no one 
would advocate a return to poverty and misery for the South so that 
the Midwest could once again enjoy a more robust economy. Similarly, 
with so much of our commercial activity now moved to the suburbs, we 
cannot abandon those spaces. But we can at least try to redress some 
of the imbalances in our energy policies that have so decimated the 
cities in the Great Lakes region. New approaches that do not directly 
encourage migration out of the cities certainly would help. Some of the 
most important energy strategies that could be deployed are those that 
can help deliver clean, inexpensive energy to midwestern communities. 
Several of those policies are set forth in the following discussion. 
Policies That Encourage DG 
The shift to clean and high-effi ciency energy systems is key to both 
sustainability and economic growth. This change will transform virtu-
ally every aspect of the economy, transportation systems, and construc-
tion, as well as the confi guration of human settlements in the twenty-
fi rst century. Urban areas in particular are highly vulnerable to paradigm 
shifts in technology. Technological innovation is the “principal mecha-
nism underlying the successive epochs of urban evolution.” Through-
out the history of American cities, changes in transportation and energy 
have been the root cause of fundamental transformation (Berry 1991). 
Forces are working together now that will transform the structure of 
urban society.5 Cities throughout the United States need to understand 
these forces and prepare themselves for the changes that are coming. 
One of those fundamental transformations will be the shift away 
from centralized generation toward a DG model. Developing a regula-
tory environment that is friendly to DG will help position communities 
for growth and sustainability. This will not only reduce the costs of 
energy in the inner city through such mechanisms as CHP, but will also 
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create jobs locally. Moreover, since DG tends to be cleaner than central-
ized generation, it also tends to make for a more pleasant environment 
in which to live and work. 
Advantages of DG for the Midwest 
Midwestern cities are well placed to play a leading role in the devel-
opment of DG. That is because the many locations where DG is likely 
to fi rst become economical are those involving generation at industrial 
sites, and midwestern cities are among the nation’s leaders in generation 
capability from industrial waste heat. According to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), Ohio, for instance, produces enough waste 
heat to “generate the equivalent power of 8 nuclear power plants” (Mar-
gonelli 2010). The Oak Ridge National Laboratory projects that waste-
heat recovery systems can be available for around $1,500 per kilowatt 
(kW) installed (Margonelli 2010)—a price that should be attractive for 
electricity-intensive manufacturing. The potential to avoid future car-
bon taxes and to create jobs also makes this of considerable interest to 
midwestern cities.6
Three other factors will likely lead to the advancement of DG in 
the Midwest. The fi rst is the April 2012 adoption of new federal EPA 
Clean Air Act pollution standards (the so-called Boiler MACT regula-
tions [EPA 2013]) that will cause area-wide capital investment into new, 
cleaner steam-generation capacity.7 Many midwestern industries have 
big, old coal boilers producing large volumes (over 100,000 pounds 
per hour) of steam. These boilers tend to work continuously, are ineffi -
cient, and require as fuel low-sulfur “compliance coal” (Casten 2012).8 
Industrial users that are considering an upgrade of their coal boilers in 
order to comply with the new rules may fi nd this to be a convenient time 
to convert to more effi cient heat-creating systems, such as CHP. With 
this approach, electricity made as a byproduct of generating heat can 
be converted for use on site, thereby dramatically improving systemic 
effi ciency. 
The second factor relates to grid congestion, especially in the Great 
Lakes areas. Northern Ohio, for example, has been grid constrained for 
a number of years. As a result, and in anticipation of retiring old coal-
burning generation facilities, First Energy now plans to undertake a $1 
billion transmission upgrade (Funk 2012). Indeed, the regional trans-
mission organization (RTO) that Ohio utilities belong to, PJM, antici-
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pates that there will be changes in the next several years to the genera-
tion fl eet producing power for Ohio on an “unprecedented scale.” PJM 
announced in May 2012 that it had purchased in an auction a “record 
amount of new generation” for 2015–2016. Northern Ohio suffered the 
highest prices in the PJM capacity market—$357 per MW, more than 
twice the PJM unconstrained price of $136 per MW (PJM 2012). All of 
these costs will be passed through to urban residents and businesses in 
the form of capacity charges on wholesale electricity bills. One expert 
projects that capacity costs alone in First Energy’s Ohio region will 
increase by 700 percent by 2014 over today’s charges, reaching $0.0317 
per kilowatt-hour (kWh) by 2015 for a user with a 50 percent load fac-
tor (Brakey 2012). Such costs could be avoided if DG were strategically 
adopted in response to the constrained grid. 
The third factor relates to another threat midwestern urban econo-
mies face: carbon regulation. Driven in part by EPA requirements to 
either clean up or shut down old coal plants and in part by a depressed 
natural gas market, much of coal electricity generation will be replaced 
by natural gas in the coming years. According to one recent study, 
even accounting for a marginal increase in life-cycle greenhouse gases 
generated through hydraulic fracturing, burning natural gas emits less 
than half the carbon that burning coal does (Hultman et al. 2011). This 
reduction in carbon emissions will likely become a critical element to 
the viability of midwestern economies, especially in urban areas that 
are so dependent on manufacturing, as increasing restrictions are placed 
on carbon emissions. CHP will in all likelihood become the most com-
pelling solution to the problem of reducing greenhouse gas emissions: it 
not only uses natural gas (or biomass) as its principal fuel, it is also far 
more effi cient than centralized generation. 
CHP systems, however, do not as a rule enjoy the benefi ts of net 
metering. Utilities do not have to pay the full value of electricity when 
taking power back onto the grid. Instead, they pay what they consider to 
be the value of displaced power, calculated at the cost of generation at 
some distant centralized point. The actual electrons may be delivered to 
a manufacturer down the road 100 yards, but the utility is not required 
to compensate for the strategic location of the power generation.9
This policy, along with the general one of guaranteeing a “cost 
plus” recovery on expenditures on the still-regulated grid, has led to 
the traditional utility being incentivized to allocate as much of its costs 
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as possible to building and operating the grid, and as little as possible 
to generateing electricity. Not surprisingly, we see as a result widely 
disparate estimates for the cost of power production from central-
ized generation. Utility accounting under this system, which may not 
include such things as the anticipated cost of decommissioning a power 
plant, typically sets a low generation cost for nuclear power. Yet the 
cost for nuclear energy generation, by most measurements, is very high 
(Vaitheeswaran 2004).10 
Needed changes in policies 
As noted by energy pundit Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain 
Institute, the old model of centralized generation with a ubiquitous grid 
was based upon the twentieth-century idea that generation was less reli-
able than the grid. But the twenty-fi rst century reality turns this model 
on its head: today, generation, especially gas turbine, is more reliable 
than the grid. Accordingly, one of the fundamental reasons for central-
ized generation no longer exists. As Lovins (2001) notes, today “the 
cheapest, most reliable power” is that which is “produced at or near the 
customers” (p. xiii).
For DG to take hold in the Midwest, several policy changes will be 
required. 
• Net metering and/or improved sales options for excess genera-
tion. Currently, in most jurisdictions excess generation cannot be 
“net metered” (i.e., the meter does not run backward), and must 
be sold back into the grid at the unbundled “generation rate” 
(i.e., the generation charge, without the transmission or distribu-
tion charge) for power. Under such circumstances, the return for 
generation is signifi cantly diminished: there is no value attrib-
uted to the strategic location of the generation near a market. For 
smaller systems (below 138 kilovolts [kV]), however, utilities 
are often required to purchase the power only at the displaced 
generation price (i.e., the “avoided cost of generation.”) In Ohio, 
the avoided cost has been set as low as $0.012 per kWh (Wiss-
man 2012). Accordingly, smaller systems will likely not even 
recover the going rate for unbundled wholesale generation. Net-
metering rules should be established for CHP, or at least regula-
tions should allow for better sales options for excess power.
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• Reduced standby rates. At the outset, it should be noted that the 
public policy case for the assessment of any standby fee is by no 
means clear. A strong argument can be made that both utilities 
and consumers benefi t greatly from DG, and it is counterproduc-
tive to charge standby fees (Casten 2003). Any measures that 
reduce the need for repair or construction of distribution and 
transmission assets inures to the benefi t of all users, not just the 
DG end users (Casten 2003; Miller 2012). Nevertheless, regu-
latory bodies are inclined to accept the utility arguments for 
the need for standby fees. The problem, then, is to determine 
what charges are reasonable under the circumstances—and what 
charges can be borne by distributed generators without rendering 
the project unviable. The EPA has determined that, unless the 
customer can avoid at least 90 percent of its otherwise applicable 
rate costs, CHP will not be viable (Weston et al. 2009). Unfortu-
nately, this number is one that is not commonly met with existing 
standby charges in most jurisdictions. In a study by the Mid-
west Clean Energy Application Center, avoided-cost percentages 
from utilities in Iowa, for instance, ranged from a low of 74 to a 
high of 81 percent among Iowa investor-owned utilities (Miller 
2012). Policies need to be established either doing away with or 
making manageable standby charges.
• Microgrid development. One way to capture the full poten-
tial of DG is through a distribution system architecture called 
a “microgrid.” Unlike DG, a microgrid consists of more than 
a single point of generation. Like DG, however, a microgrid 
should have the ability to isolate itself (islanding) from the util-
ity’s distribution system during a grid disturbance. Islanding has 
the potential to give a higher level of reliability to end users than 
that provided by the macrogrid system as a whole.11 The typi-
cal microgrid uses DG and cogeneration to provide both elec-
tricity and heat to multiple customers joined together on a local 
network. Microgrids also offer potential advantages in power 
quality and reliability over macrogrids, which tend to provide 
homogeneous power quality when customers may have hetero-
geneous requirements (Neville 2008). There is currently consid-
erable uncertainty over how microgrids will be regulated, but 
under most jurisdictions, it appears that only utilities can operate 
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microgrids. There will need to be clarity in the regulations over 
how microgrids may be operated and who may operate them 
before they can be deployed. 
However, the policies necessary to enable DG are not just regulatory
in nature. Urban universities, for instance, can play a critical leader-
ship role in preparing cities for a transition to DG. To accomplish this, 
universities should change their approach toward technical education 
for the energy industry, and federal and state governments need to sup-
port this shift. Policies that promote DG will have little value if there is 
not a workforce that is capable of deploying the new technologies, and, 
importantly, of understanding the value proposition associated with 
DG. Without such a workforce, transactional costs threaten to slow the 
advancement of DG. 
For centralized generation, professional services have traditionally 
comprised a small percentage of the total project cost. Accordingly, 
utilities have engaged the biggest and most expensive law fi rms, banks, 
architectural and engineering fi rms—and money has been no object. 
But in the world of DG, projects may cost $300,000 instead of $300 
million. Yet many of the same legal, regulatory, fi nancial, and engineer-
ing issues arise in small projects as in large projects; transactional costs 
do not go down in proportion to project size. Today’s energy-systems 
professional needs to be nimble, trained in multiple disciplines, and 
capable of assessing value inexpensively. 
State and federal resources should be brought to bear on urban 
four-year engineering and engineering technology programs through-
out America, but especially in the Midwest, to create comprehensive, 
cross-disciplinary energy-systems training. Under current university 
models, applied technology is not a priority, and certainly the social 
sciences are not. Universities are rewarded with large research grants 
with generous overhead compensation for energy technology, espe-
cially through federally funded programs such as the National Science 
Foundation. But applied engineering programs and research on social 
impediments to the adoption of advanced energy do not generally get 
this same sort of support.
Midwestern urban areas have the most to lose if a transition to DG 
is not enabled. Ohio, for instance, is highly vulnerable to a carbon tax or 
a cap and trade system. Roughly 88 percent of Ohio’s power generation 
comes from burning coal. In the meantime, Ohio, which is ranked sev-
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enth nationally in population, is ranked sixth in total energy consump-
tion, fourth in industrial energy consumption, and fourth in greenhouse 
gas emissions (Consortium for Energy, Economics, and the Environ-
ment 2008). In short, Ohio’s economy is dependent on traditional forms 
of energy generation that are patently unsustainable. Urban universities 
in Ohio and other midwestern states must take the lead in helping to 
rewrite regulatory law and in retraining their workforces for the inevi-
table paradigm shift from central to distributed power generation. State 
and federal resources need to enable this transition to be made without 
a massive disruption of midwestern economies. 
Exploitation of Shale Formations
One of the most exciting and promising developments for the urban 
economies of both the Midwest and the Northeast has been improve-
ments in drilling and completion techniques in the oil and gas industry. 
Specifi cally, horizontal drilling and new hydrofracturing technologies 
have enabled oil and gas companies to produce hydrocarbons from 
organically rich shale deposits that were laid down in sedimentary 
basins hundreds of millions of years ago. Previously, shale formations 
had been too impermeable to produce hydrocarbons in commercial 
quantities. Now, suddenly, vast commercially producible oil and gas 
reserves exist in areas of Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, North 
Dakota, and other places around the world. For the fi rst time since the 
1800s, the Midwest is poised to not only be self-suffi cient, but even to 
export oil and gas. 
This will of course be a badly needed shot in the arm for the fl ag-
ging economies of the Midwest. Related job creation in fi nancial and 
legal centers such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Columbus, Akron, Canton, 
and Youngstown has already begun. More will be coming as drilling 
picks up. In addition, shale development tends to be more service-
industry intensive than traditional oil and gas exploration because of 
the relatively high cost of drilling and completing wells, and the high 
rate of production decline (requiring more drilling). In other words, 
there will be more wells and more completions, yet fewer failures, driv-
ing a robust new oil and gas service industry. Even though much of the 
early wealth to be generated from this industry will be for rural land-
owners, inevitably the urban areas of the Midwest will benefi t greatly, 
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not only from the reduced hydrocarbon prices, but also from profes-
sional service companies locating in cities to be close to a skilled work-
force and to transportation hubs. 
Pennsylvania has been the forerunner in economic development as 
a result of shale drilling. According to one study by Penn State Univer-
sity, the Marcellus Shale development has led directly to 44,000 jobs in 
2009 in that state, creating around $3.9 billion in economic value added 
to Pennsylvania, with $8 billion more in 2010 and $10 billion more 
in 2011 (Considine, Watson, and Blumsack 2010). Likewise, in Ohio, 
economists have estimated that by 2014, 64,000 jobs will be supported 
as a result of developing the Utica Shale, adding some $4.9 billion to 
the state’s gross domestic product (Thomas et al. 2012)
But setting aside these promising employment numbers resulting 
directly from oil and gas exploration, perhaps the best news for mid-
western urban economies will be the long-term source of cheap natural 
gas. Shale gas has transformed the American energy landscape almost 
overnight: between 2006 and 2011, natural gas prices dropped from 
over $10 per mcf to under $4 per mcf (U.S. Energy Information Agency 
2012a). Shale gas, which comprised less than 2 percent of the gas pro-
duced in the United States in 2000, now comprises 37 percent—and is 
rising (Yergin 2012). In the meantime, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 
in 2012 were the lowest since 1992, due in principal part to the rapid 
replacement of coal with natural gas as a source of electricity (U.S. 
Energy Information Agency 2012b).12 
States such as Ohio will no longer be experiencing huge trade defi -
cits due to the purchase of oil from the Middle East. This newfound 
source of oil and gas promises a stable, 20–30-year supply of inexpen-
sive hydrocarbons to heat homes, to generate electricity, and to fuel 
transportation. The Energy Information Agency projects natural gas 
prices of between $4 and $8 per mcf through 2035 as a result of the 
“shale gale” (U.S. Energy Information Agency 2012a). Further, petro-
chemical companies, which also rely on long-term, inexpensive and 
stable supplies of natural gas for feedstock, can justify the fi nancial 
commitment to locate or expand manufacturing in the Midwest. 
State and federal policies should encourage shale development. 
Regulation of the industry must be tight, sure, and comprehensive; any 
spills or contamination from wastewater generated by drilling will set 
back development enormously. State regulatory agencies and state geo-
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logical surveys must be completely independent from the oil and gas 
industry under their purview and be fully funded. This can be done 
through severance and other taxes generated by oil and gas produc-
tion and also through long-overdue taxes on imported oil, especially 
from those locations where U.S. military presence is required to safely 
transport oil to American ports. This latter policy, more than any, has 
the potential to provide ample resources to enable the safe production of 
U.S. oil and gas supplies from unconventional sources while restoring 
wealth to American cities. 
Importantly, midwestern cities should not use the newfound hydro-
carbon wealth to go back to business as usual. While the oil and gas 
reserves located in shale beds in the Midwest and the Northeast pro-
vide a more climate-friendly alternative to burning coal, they are still 
an exhaustible resource that emits large amounts of carbon into the 
atmosphere. These reserves should be considered as a bridge to an eco-
nomy based on hydrogen, electric transportation, and renewable energy 
generation—an economy where oil and gas are used primarily in the 
petrochemical sector rather than the energy sector. Policymakers in the 
Midwest have an opportunity to do something that their counterparts 
in Texas, Louisiana, and even the federal government have failed to do 
with their respective oil and gas largesse: plan for the inevitable transi-
tion to alternative energy supplies without a massive disruption of the 
economy. 
Policies That Refl ect the Actual Costs of Transportation 
and Power Delivery 
For some 80 years our energy policies have placed the burden of 
growth in rural locales on the urban areas. That policy must be reversed. 
Now it is time for the rural areas, or at least the suburbs, to support 
growth in the inner city. The same sort of program that led to the devel-
opment of rural electrifi cation should now be put into place in our inner 
cities: subsidized loans and grants for DG and access to cheap, feder-
ally supported electricity. Municipal utilities in particular would benefi t 
from having priority for the cheapest electricity available, from which 
savings could be used to attract business, industry, and residents back 
to the city. 
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Monetizing some of the external costs of power generation and 
gasoline consumption would also help cities, especially in the Midwest. 
For instance, if the actual cost of air conditioning were passed on to 
consumers, manufacturing management might reach a different conclu-
sion about the benefi ts of relocating operations from the Midwest to the 
South or Southwest. Similarly, if the total cost of transportation were 
passed on to commuters, residents might reach a different conclusion 
about the benefi ts of moving ever farther from the city. 
Just as we have seen decades of policy subsidizing rural electrifi ca-
tion over urban electrifi cation, we have also seen decades of policy sub-
sidizing rural transportation over urban transportation. This is another 
policy that must be reversed. We cannot now abandon our reliance on 
interstate highways. However, we can fund programs that make life 
easier for residents of midwestern cities. This begins with better trans-
portation systems. 
Better, faster, and more comfortable public transportation would 
certainly be a major fi rst step. It will require a signifi cant and continu-
ous subsidy to sustain such a program, because it will take decades to 
see the demographic response. In many of the Great Lakes cities, the 
hardest part about transportation is driving in snow. Public transporta-
tion could alleviate much of this problem. 
Winter travel is problematic not just for commuting, however; it 
is also a problem for walking in the city. Many midwestern cities can-
not afford to effectively plow and salt roads and sidewalks, and walk-
ing becomes an adventure. Funds should be directed to cities to enable 
them to respond quickly to winter storms. Sidewalks and crosswalks 
can be heated by underground steam systems to keep them free of ice. 
Better still, underground passageways can be built connecting down-
town urban centers such as universities, museums, sports venues, com-
mercial districts, arts districts, and offi ce parks. Houston has such an 
underground tunnel system in its downtown, and it is used mostly in 
the hot, humid summer. A number of Canadian cities have downtown 
indoor walkways; Montreal’s underground complex is so vast that it is 
known as the ville intérieure, the “indoor city.” Midwestern cities could 
have a similar system in their downtown areas for winter activities. To 
be sure, these sorts of programs are not easily accomplished, especially 
in a bad economy. But the rural electrifi cation program was established 
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in a far worse economy. It will take the same sort of effort to rebuild 
midwestern cities to their former glory. 
Regional Energy Planning
The Midwest today has an opportunity to reimagine sustainable 
industrialization. More than anything else, a return to a healthy manu-
facturing base would lead to a revitalization of urban areas. Manufac-
turing has long been the lifeblood of the midwestern urban economy, 
but it is also an energy-intensive business, especially for such indus-
tries that produce aluminum, steel, chemicals, and glass. Manufacturers 
account for roughly one-half of U.S. natural gas and 30 percent of its 
electricity consumption. Accordingly, a secure, reliable, and affordable 
source of electricity is a top priority for midwestern manufacturers. 
Those manufacturers for which electricity costs make up an especially 
signifi cant portion of their product costs are most vulnerable to rapid 
rate increases (Ohio Manufacturers’ Association 2010). The ongoing 
decline in manufacturing jobs throughout America has accelerated 
in recent years, refl ecting not just high electricity costs, but also the 
return to $100 per bbl oil and the “high priced fuel syndrome.” Ohio has 
lost some 117,000 manufacturing jobs in the the period of 2008–2012 
alone—the second highest total in America (Thomas 2012).
With foresight and planning, the Midwest can develop energy poli-
cies to help reverse this trend. As outlined in this chapter, forces are 
coming together today that necessitate rethinking industrialization in 
the Midwest. Rising electricity capacity charges, EPA Boiler MACT 
laws, carbon emission reduction mandates, and the development of 
shale gas all demand that midwestern policymakers formulate strate-
gies for enabling DG and a conversion of transportation fl eets to natural 
gas or electricity. 
Urban areas would benefi t from collaboration between local gov-
ernments and industries to develop regional energy-planning scenarios. 
This will be especially important in older, more densely populated areas 
of the Great Lakes and the Midwest, where DG holds so much promise. 
DG, especially CHP, will not be a “one size fi ts all” application; every 
situation requires an analysis specifi c to those circumstances. How-
ever, planning can help manufacturers identify strategies to use “off the 
shelf” technologies when possible. 
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In particular, for regions with a large variety of manufacturing and 
other electricity-intensive users, a coordinated CHP program can be 
useful to organizations trying to fi nd a fi t for their power and heat needs. 
Such a program might be set up to address three strategic areas:
1) commercial buildings and small industrial applications—deploy-
ing similar equipment and similar fi nancial goals and capabilities; 
2) institutional facilities—usually with larger power and heat 
requirements and with much longer-term fi nancing abilities, 
which are more amenable to Energy Savings Company (ESCO) 
savings structures (arrangements whereby energy savings real-
ized are used to fund effi ciency upgrades); and 
3) major industrial and district heating CHPs, where large-scale 
power is generated, visibility is high, and the returns to the dis-
tricts and industries involved are potentially great.
The development of an energy master plan might begin with a Geo-
graphical Information System–based “energy map” that is prepared at a 
neighborhood, local authority, or subregional scale. It would include an 
assessment of existing building energy demands as a baseline, identify 
likely locations for new business development, and assess effects on 
energy demand. It might also include a “heat map,” identifying anchor 
heat loads, such as large public buildings (King and Shaw 2010). 
These energy maps could reveal CHP-generated district heating 
opportunities that local authorities or project managers might be willing 
to support. They may also inform growth options and serve as the start-
ing point for energy planning for developers. A decentralized energy 
master plan could include technical, planning, fi nancial, and legal sup-
port—all better enabling manufacturers to evaluate DG opportunities. 
Local energy planning can provide a road map for manufactur-
ing to identify strategies for developing on-site DG opportunities. For 
the reasons discussed earlier, transactional costs threaten small-scale 
generation. Manufacturers are generally unwilling to spend hundreds 
of thousands of dollars identifying potential DG projects. Regional 
energy planning reduces these costs for manufacturers by identifying 
not only potential projects, but also possible collaborators and sources 
of funding. 
Traditionally, regional energy plans have been developed in the 
United States to address climate action plans and to decrease reliance 
up14wbrttrch7.indd   180 1/10/2014   10:11:30 AM
How Energy Policy Enabled the Decline of Midwestern Cities   181
on fossil fuels.13 However, the type of energy-mapping strategies that 
were developed for London, England, will be required to enable manu-
facturing to identify opportunities to provide district heating through 
CHP projects. That approach included a 10-stage undertaking with, 
among other things, data gathering, project identifi cation, fi nancial 
modeling, and feasibility studies (King and Shaw 2010). This sort of 
information would signifi cantly enhance manufacturing’s appetite for 
undertaking DG. 
Finally, any regional energy study should include an investigation 
into the transformation of transportation fl eets to compressed or lique-
fi ed natural gas and to electric vehicles. Notwithstanding the advent of 
oil development from shale formations such as the Bakken in North 
Dakota and the Utica in Ohio, the United States will continue to be an 
oil-importing nation. By substituting natural gas or electricity for gaso-
line and diesel for our transportation fl eets, we can reduce our nearly 
billion-dollar-per-day trade defi cit (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2013), 
and in the process decrease greenhouse gas emissions. With natural gas 
trading for a fraction of the cost of oil for the foreseeable future, this 
transition would save money and repatriate dollars domestically. 
Urban areas can facilitate this change by identifying infrastructure 
needs and by developing strategic locations for refueling and recharg-
ing stations. In areas where shale gas is abundant, additional planning 
may enable the development of refueling stations near gathering, trans-
portation, compression, storage, and distribution infrastructure. Water 
use and discharge planning would further enhance shale development, 
as would road use and maintenance planning. 
CONCLUSIONS
In American society, policy is set by advocacy. Unfortunately, 
under this system, those entities with a preference toward maintain-
ing the status quo have a signifi cant advantage in setting policy—even 
when that course of action is not in the general public interest. No 
fi eld of enterprise suffers from this problem more than does the energy 
industry, in which the stakes are enormous, and change can be disrup-
tive. Incumbent industries have propagated the notion that we cannot 
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replace our current energy models with new ones. Even when unbiased 
information is set forth, the public struggles to understand it; an unsus-
pecting citizenry is unable to differentiate between a vested interest and 
an independent expert.
This problem helps to explain why programs such as subsidies for 
rural electrifi cation continue to exist some 40 years after 99 percent of 
American farms have been connected to the grid. It also is a caution-
ary message to policymakers who may want to rectify the imbalance: 
energy policies that enable and encourage migration from the cities, 
especially from those in the Midwest, will be very diffi cult to change. 
Not only do these cities face the problem of overcoming vested inter-
ests, they are also dealing with reduced political might as a result of 
decades of population and wealth fl ight. It will require considerable 
political courage for policymakers to undertake the sort of long-term 
commitments to energy policy that will be needed for midwestern cities 
to return to the robust economies they once enjoyed. But this starts by 
recognizing the complicity that long-existing energy policies have had 
in creating the decline of urban economies in the fi rst place.
Notes
The author gratefully acknowledges research and editing support for this chapter from 
Su Gao and Srikanth Sivashankaran.
1. The federal portion of this does not vary; it is around $0.18 per gallon. For a dis-
cussion of the history of the excise tax, see Pirog (2010).
2. As noted in Slivinski (2009), rural electricity is just one of a number of utility 
services subsidized by urban dwellers.
3. California was also the location for the fi rst failures in deregulation. A combina-
tion of fi xed retail prices and rising costs of generation, together with some market 
manipulation by Enron and others, nearly left several California utilities insolvent.
4. Pfi ffner (2009) argues that the current partisan culture has its roots in the demo-
graphic change brought on by the advent of air conditioning.
5. Berry (1991) argues that massive change following technical innovation acceler-
ates during times of “stagfl ation,” such as we are arguably experiencing in America 
today. This acceleration in growth comes as a result of a combination of investors 
recognizing opportunity in depressed prices and public offi cials recognizing that 
help is needed to get the economy moving again. Both forces are at work today.
6. According to Policy Matters Ohio (2012), as many as 20,000 jobs could be created 
from cogeneration, and the release into the atmosphere of 13 metric tons of carbon 
dioxide would be avoided.
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7. The Ohio Public Utilities Commission resolved in February 2012 to develop an 
educational forum to begin a pilot program to advance and share information 
about combined heat and power as a strategy for compliance with the new Boiler 
MACT rules. “Boiler MACT” refers to the set of adjustments to the Clean Air 
Act that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency instituted December 20, 2012, 
specifi c to certain categories of boilers and solid waste incinerators. The adjust-
ments made include emission limits for certain pollutants specifi cally targeted at 
categories of boilers and solid waste incinerators, changes to the subcategories of 
boilers in establishing standards, a revised implementation timeline, and adhering 
to established standards for the “highest emitting of the highest 0.4 percent of 
boilers” (EPA 2013).
8. Compliance coals run around $90 per ton, or $3.60 per mmbtu (million British 
Thermal Units, which measure energy content); 1 million btus are roughly equiva-
lent to 1,000 cubic fee (mcf) of natural gas. If a boiler were 75 percent effi cient, 
this means that the cost of delivered steam would be $4.80 per mmbtu.
9. Ohio’s original net-metering law was enacted in 1999 as part of the state’s 
electric-industry restructuring legislation. The Public Utilities Commission of 
OHIO (PUCO) later revised its net-metering rules in March 2007, prompted by 
the federal Energy Policy Act of 2005. Initially, PUCO required utilities to credit 
customers’ net excess generation at the utility’s full retail rate. However, in June 
2002, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that each utility must credit excess generation 
to the customer at the utility’s unbundled generation rate. See http://energy.gov/
savings/net-metering-29 (accessed October 24, 2013).
10. This policy of allocating costs when possible to the grid rather than to generation, 
in addition to ensuring the cost-plus return, makes certain that the utility genera-
tion is highly competitive in the wholesale market.
11. For purposes of this discussion, nongrid-connected microgrids are not considered, 
although these may have some application in more isolated areas.
12. Not all observers agree that shale gas has been a signifi cant contributor to this 
trend. See Howarth (2011).
13. See, for example, Kane County (2011) and San Diego Association of Governments 
(1994).
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